to Dummett (2002) , who doubts the coherence of the bilateral approach to start with (being skeptical about the possibility of a non-question begging account of the classical understanding of negation), I grant its intelligibility only to raise a technical problem -possibly a serious difficulty for bilateralism.
In a bilateral theory of sense, the force of assertion and denial are primitive, symmetric features of speech acts. In particular, the denial of a sentence is not to be explained -as in unilateralist theories -as the assertion of the negation of the sentence. It is the other way around for the bilateralist:
the sense of negation is determined by rules of introduction and elimination which rely upon the illocutionary forces of both assertion and denial. 2 We follow Rumfitt's terminology and use signed sentences +A and −A as formal correlates of the operation of forming an interrogative from a declarative sentence A and appending the answer 'Yes', respectively 'No'. 3 The signalling cannot be iterated, e.g. +(−A) or −(−A) are not well-formed sentences (by the way, this feature syntactically distinguishes the '−' sign from the negation sign '¬'). Where α is a signed sentence, let α * be the signed sentence obtained by reversing the sign of α. Note that (α * ) * is the same sentence as α. We use a notation of the form Γ α to say that the signed sentence α has a natural deduction proof from (open) assumptions lying within the (finite) set of signed sentences Γ. We also allow α to be the punctuation sign '⊥' (the insertion of this sign is just a colourful way to mark that a certain proof configuration has been reached.) As usual, Rumfitt's calculus has introduction and elimination rules for the propositional connectives. In addition, it also has co-ordination principles that govern the relationship between correctly asserting and correctly denying a sentence. These principles are necessary for endowing sentences with a coherent bilateral sense because, for instance, the conditions for correctly asserting a sentence must not intersect with the conditions for correctly denying it. Notice that there are no co-ordination principles in unilateral theories of sense: in unilateralism there is nothing to co-ordinate. Rumfitt says that 'plainly, inference rules for connectives cannot ensure that the atomic sentences of the relevant language meet this condition [viz. that the conditions for correctly asserting a sentence do not intersect with the conditions for correctly denying it]. They can, however, ensure that if the language's atomic sentences meet it then molecular sentences will meet it too. They can, one might put it, ensure that co-ordination is preserved' (Rumfitt's italics). (Rumfitt 2002, p. 308.) Rumfitt proposes the following two co-ordination principles:
(Rumfitt 2000, p. 804.) The first co-ordination principle indicates that accepting α and α * marks a dead end, a dead end from which one can escape by discharging one assumption according to the second co-ordination principle. On the intended bilateralist reading of the formalism, the second co-ordination principle mirrors (at the atomic level) a symmetry between asserting and denying a sentence -and this is the hallmark of bilateralism.
For the sake of the argument, we accept both co-ordination principles for signed atomic sentences (i.e. for α and β of the form +P or −P , with P an atomic sentence). In other words, we presuppose that the bilateralist has an account for correctly asserting and for correctly denying atomic sentences (in a given area of discourse) such that (C1) and (C2) hold for signed atomic sentences α. 4 Otherwise, the account for correctly asserting and correctly denying molecular sentences is fully specified from the atomic case by means of the introduction and elimination rules of the logical operators.
In Rumfitt's calculus, the law of double negation elimination is easily derivable. Nevertheless, this is not enough to sustain classical logic. Quite to the contrary, we want to draw attention to the fact that Rumfitt's logical system is seriously paralysed if the co-ordination principles do not hold for all sentences of the language. It is easy to show that +(A ∨ ¬A) is itself a co-ordination principle of type (C2), namely the co-ordination principle that permits to move from the sequent −(A ∨ ¬A) ⊥ to the sequent +(A ∨ ¬A). This is so because the sequent −(A ∨ ¬A) ⊥ can be derived using only the introduction and elimination rules. Dually, −(A&¬A) is also a co-ordination principle of type (C2), the one that permits to obtain the sequent −(A&¬A) from the sequent +(A&¬A) ⊥. Therefore, both the law of excluded middle and the law of non-contradiction are co-ordination principles of type (C2). Surprisingly, whereas the first co-ordination principle (C1) receives careful attention in Rumfitt's article (and is preserved by the propositional connectives), the second co-ordination principle (C2) is hardly discussed. In the sequel, I show that the co-ordination principle (C2) is not preserved. Indeed, I will show that Rumfitt's introduction and elimination rules together with the co-ordination principles for signed atomic sentences do not entail −(A&¬A), even for atomic A.
The counterexample
In this section we describe a Kripke model counterexample to the preservation of the co-ordination principle (C2). A Kripke structure W for Rumfitt's signed calculus consists of the following data: a) a non-empty set W of possible worlds; b) an accessibility relation ≤ in W , i.e. a reflexive and transitive binary relation in W ; c) valuation maps v + and v − that assign to each propositional letter P a subset of W . Intuitively, v + (P ) is the set of worlds in which P is true, and v − (P ) is the set of worlds in which P is false.
Moreover, the following three clauses must hold for all propositional letters P :
(ii) ∀w∀w (if w ∈ v + (P ) and w ≤ w then w ∈ v + (P )); (iii) ∀w∀w (if w ∈ v − (P ) and w ≤ w then w ∈ v − (P )).
Definition. Given a Kripke structure W, w a world, and A a propositional sentence, we simultaneously define w |= Lemma. Let W be a Kripke structure. If w, w are worlds with w ≤ w , α is a signed sentence, and w |= W α, then w |= W α.
Given a finite set Γ of signed sentences {α 1 , . . . , α k } and a world w, we let w |= W Γ abbreviate w |= W α 1 , w |= W α 2 , . . . , w |= W α k .
Definition. Let Γ be a finite set of signed sentences and α a signed sentence.
Let W be a Kripke structure. We say that Γ |= W α if the following holds:
In the sequel, we write Γ * α for saying that there is a natural deduction proof of α from Γ in Rumfitt's calculus without the co-ordination principles.
The following soundness theorem is instrumental:
Theorem. Let Γ be a finite set of signed sentences and α a signed sentence.
If Γ * α then, for every Kripke structure W, Γ |= W α. By the arbitrariness of w, we have showed that Γ |= W +A.
We follow Rumfitt's idiosyncrasy according to which the symbol '⊥' is merely a punctuation sign indicating that one has reached deductions of α and α * , for some signed atomic sentence α. On this reading, the coordination principle (C1) is superfluous for atomic sentences (and it can be proved for formulas in general). Let us fix a Kripke structure W. Because of condition (i), Γ |= W ⊥ says that there is no world w such that w |= W Γ.
Therefore, in semantical terms, the co-ordination principle (C2) says that if there is no world w such that w |= W Γ ∪ {β} then Γ |= W β * .
We are now ready to give the counterexample U. It is:
In the above, P is a propositional letter (we ignore the others). The Kripke structure U has three worlds {w 0 , w 1 , w 2 }, ordered according to the picture above (w 0 ≤ w 1 and w 0 ≤ w 2 ), and whose valuations are v + (P ) = {w 1 } and
We claim that this structure satisfies the co-ordination principle (C2)
for β = +P and β = −P . Let Γ be a (finite) set of sentences and suppose that there is no world w ∈ {w 0 , w 1 , w 2 } such that w |= U Γ ∪ {+P }. Let u |= U Γ. By the lemma, for u with u ≤ u one also has u |= U Γ and, therefore, u |= U +P . In other words, there is no world accessible from u in which +P holds. This entails that u must be w 2 . Since v − (P ) = {w 2 }, we get u |= U −P . By the arbitrariness of u, we proved that Γ |= U −P . A symmetrical argument also holds for −P instead of +P .
We have showed that U satisfies the co-ordination principles at the atomic level. However, it does not satisfy them in general. This can be seen by checking that w 0 |= U −(P &¬P ).
Coda
Rumfitt (2000) proposes a new conception of the sense of the logical words according to which classical logic is justified. This conception is based on the novel idea that the uses of sentences must take into account not only the conditions under which they may correctly be asserted but also under which they may be correctly denied. This binary feature is the main characteristic of the bilateral approach to sense. A necessary condition for a sentence to have a coherent bilateral sense is that the acts of asserting it and rejecting it should be co-ordinated. Inference rules for connectives cannot ensure that the atomic sentences are co-ordinated. This is something that must be formally postulated (and argued for in concreto). Since the sense of a molecular sentence must be fully determined by the introduction and elimination rules of its principal connective (given the conditions for asserting and denying the ingredient sentences), the co-ordination principles for arbitrary sentences must not be postulated. They should rather follow from the rules and the co-ordination at the atomic level. This is not the case, however. As a consequence, some very basic laws of logic are unaccounted for, posing a serious problem for Rumfitt's bilateralism.
